The Melian Dialogue

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In this passage from Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides imagines the diplomatic negotiations between the Athenians, who wish to annex the relatively weak island state of Melos to their empire, and the Melians, who rely on the Lakedaimonians (Athens' enemy) to protect them.

This episode, now over 2400 years old, has become a timeless examination of the rights of nations and of how stronger nations manipulate ideas of justice to their own ends. Thucydides' account is refreshingly uncluttered by spin and propaganda, so it is much easier to follow than is usually the case in modern politics. Melos argues for independence and neutrality, while still attempting to take account of Realpolitik; Athens argues the rights of power, and their own financial needs for war.

There's nothing new under the sun: Thucydides' ideas about international politics, power, and the reasons for conflict are as scary today as they were in Ancient Greece. As a mental experiment, try substituting another nation starting with "A" for the Athenians, and take note of how much of this dialogue still rings true.

[...] The Athenians also made an expedition against the island of Melos with thirty ships of their own, six Chian, and two Lesbian vessels, 1600 heavy infantry, 300 archers, 20 mounted archers from Athens, and about 1500 heavy infantry from the allies and the islanders. The Melians are a colony of Lakedaimon that would not submit to the Athenians like the other islands. At first they remained neutral and took no part in the war, but afterwards, when the Athenians had brought violence and plundered their territory, assumed an attitude of open hostility.

The generals Kleomedes son of Lykomedes and Tisias son of Tisimachos set up camp in their territory with the above armament, but before they did any damage to their land sent ambassadors to negotiate. The Melians did not bring these ambassadors before the people, but told them to state the object of their mission to the magistrates and the governing class. At this meeting the Athenian ambassadors spoke as follows.

Athenians. We are aware of the reason why we have been brought before the government: the negotiations are not to go on before the people, so that we should not be able to speak straight on without interruption, and so deceive the ears of the multitude by seductive arguments which would pass without refutation. That being the case, what if you who sit there were to pursue an even more cautious method? Do not make any set speech yourselves, then, but address us on whatever points you are not happy with; settle them before going any farther. Tell us, first, if our proposal suits you.

The Melian commissioners answered:

Melians. We would have no grounds for objecting on grounds of fairness, if you and we were to instruct each other quietly as you propose. But your military preparations are too far advanced to match what you say. We can see that you have come to be judges in your own cause, and that all we can reasonably expect from this negotiation is either war, if we turn out to be in the right and refuse to submit, and if not, we can expect slavery.

Athenians. If you have met to indulge in speculations about the future, or for any reason other than to consult for the safety of your state on the basis of the facts that you see before you, we shall leave. Otherwise let us continue.

Melians. It is only natural and excusable for men in our position to consider a variety of courses of speech and courses of action. However, the question in this conference is, as you say, the safety of our country; and if you will, the discussion may proceed in the way you propose.

Athenians. For our part, we do not intend to waste time with specious claims -- either of how we have a right to our empire because we overthrew the Persians, or of how we are now attacking you because you have done us some wrong -- and make long speeches which you would not believe. In return we hope that you will not attempt to distract us by pointing out that you have not joined the Lakedaimonians, although you are their colonists, or that you have done us no wrong. Rather we hope that you will aim at what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments of us both. You know as well as we do that in this world, justice is a subject for debate only between those who are equals in power. Those who are stronger do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.

Melians. Since you command us to leave justice aside and speak only of interest, we shall speak as we are obliged. At the very least, we consider that it is expedient that you should not destroy what protects us both: the privilege of being allowed to invoke what is fair and right when in danger, and even to profit by arguments which are not strictly valid, if they can be got to pass as accepted. You have as much of an interest in this as any, as the event of your own collapse would prompt the heaviest vengeance against you, and would be an example for the world to take note of.

Athenians. The end of our empire, if it should end, does not frighten us. A rival empire like Lakedaimon (even if Lakedaimon were our real enemy) is not so terrible to those whom they conquer; it is a far worse situation when subjects rise up by themselves, and attack and overpower their rulers. So, this is a risk that we are willing to take. We shall now proceed to demonstrate that we have come here in the interest of our empire, and that we shall say what we will say for the preservation of your country. For we would prefer to exercise that empire over you without any fuss, and see you preserved, to our mutual advantage.

Melians. And how, do tell, could it turn out to be as good for us to be slaves as for you to rule?

Athenians. Because you would have the advantage of submitting before suffering the worst. We have something to gain by allowing you to exist.

Melians. So you would not accept that we should be neutral: to be your friends rather than enemies, but not to be allies of either side.

Athenians. No. Your hostility cannot so much hurt us; but to be friends on an equal basis would suggest to our subjects that we were weak. Your enmity, by contrast, can only serve as a proof of our power.

Melians. Is that your subjects' idea of equality, to put those who have nothing to do with you in the same category with nations that are, most of them, your own colonies, plus a few conquered rebel states?

Athenians. As far as justice goes, they think the one group has as much justice as the other; and that if any remain independent it is because they are strong, and that if we do not molest them it is because we are afraid. As a result, as well as extending our empire, we should gain in security by annexing you. The fact that you are islanders, and weaker than others, makes it all the more important that you should not succeed in resisting the masters of the sea.

Melians. But do you really think that there is no security in the policy we suggest? For here again, if you debar us from talking about justice and invite us to obey your interest, we also must explain ours, and try to persuade you, if the two happen to coincide. How can you avoid making enemies of all existing neutrals who will look at this case and infer from it that one day or another you will attack them? Surely that course will only make greater the enemies that you have already, and force others to become enemies who would otherwise have never thought of it.

Athenians. Well, the fact is that those on the mainland generally give us little cause for alarm. The liberty which they enjoy will prevent their taking precautions against us for a long time. No, it is islanders like yourselves who are outside our empire, and our subjects who are discontented under our yoke, who would be the most likely to take a rash step and lead themselves and us into obvious danger.

Melians. Well then, if you risk so much to retain your empire, and to get rid of it would be to put yourselves at risk from your subjects, surely it would be enormously disgraceful and cowardly if we, who are still free, did not try everything that can be tried before submitting to your yoke.

Athenians. Not if you are well advised. The contest is not an equal one, one where honour is the prize and shame is the penalty. Rather it is a question of survival; and of not resisting those who are far stronger than you are.

Melians. But we know that the fortune of war is sometimes more impartial than the disproportion of numbers might lead one to expect. To submit is to give ourselves over to despair, while action still preserves for us a hope that we may stand upright.

Athenians. Hope is a comfort to those who are in danger, and may be indulged by those who have abundant resources -- not perhaps without loss, but certainly without ruin -- but its nature is to be extravagant. Those who go so far as to invest everything they have in a venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined. So long as their discovery of its true nature would enable them to take preventive action against it, hope is never found wanting. Do not let this be the case with you: you are weak and you hang on a single turn of the scales. Do not be like the vulgar either; when visible hopes fail them in extremity, they abandon such security as human means may still afford, and turn to invisible hopes, to prophecies and oracles, and other such inventions that delude people with hopes to their destruction.

Melians. You may be sure that we are as well aware as you are of the difficulty of contending against your power and fortune, unless the terms are equal. But we trust that the gods may grant us fortune as good as yours, since we are just men fighting against injustice, and that where we are lacking in power, this will be made up by the alliance of the Lakedaimonians; for they are bound, even if only for shame, to come to the aid of their kindred. Our confidence, therefore, is not so utterly irrational after all.

Athenians. When you speak of the favour of the gods, we have as much reason as yourselves to hope for that. Neither our pretensions nor our conduct are in any way contrary to what men believe about the gods, or what they practise among themselves. About the gods it is our belief, and about men it is our certain knowledge, that it is a necessary law of their nature for them to have power wherever they can. It is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when it was made. We found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us. All we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, if you had the same power as we have, would do the same. So as far as the gods are concerned, we have no fear and no reason to fear that we shall be at a disadvantage. But when we come to your notion about the Lakedaimonians, which leads you to believe that shame will make them help you, here we commend your simplicity but do not envy your folly. The Lakedaimonians may be the worthiest men alive when their own interests or their country's laws are in question; we might go on at length about their conduct towards others; but to give an idea of it briefly, we can do no better than point out that of all the men we know, they are most conspicuous in deciding that whatever is agreeable is honourable, and whatever is expedient is just. That kind of mindset does not bode well for the safety which you now unreasonably count upon.

Melians. But it is for this very reason that we now trust to their respect for expediency to prevent them from betraying the Melians, their colonists, for they would thereby lose the confidence of their friends in Greece, and help their enemies.

Athenians. Then you are rejecting the fact that expediency goes with security. Justice and honour, on the other hand, cannot be pursued without danger. And the Lakedaimonians generally court danger as little as possible.

Melians. But we believe that they would be more likely to face even danger for our sake, and would do so with more confidence than they would for others, because our nearness to the Peloponnese makes it easier for them to act, and our common blood ensures that we will be loyal.

Athenians. Yes, but an intending ally does not put faith in the goodwill of those who ask for aid, but rather in having a decisive superiority of power to act. And the Lakedaimonians look to this even more than others. At any rate, their distrust of their home resources is such that that they attack a neighbour only with help from numerous allies; is it likely that while we are masters of the sea they will cross over to an island?

Melians. But they would have others to send. The Cretan Sea is a wide one, and it is more difficult for those who command it to intercept others, than for those who wish to elude them to do so safely. And if the Lakedaimonians should miscarry in this, they would fall upon your land, and upon those left of your allies whom Brasidas did not reach; and you will then have to fight for your own country and your own confederacy, rather than for places which are not yours.

Athenians. You may one day experience some diversion of the kind you speak of, only to learn, as others have done, that the Athenians have never once yet withdrawn from a siege for fear of anyone. But it occurs to us that, after saying you would consult for the safety of your country, in all this discussion you have not mentioned anything which people might trust in and expect to be saved by. Your strongest arguments depend upon hope and the future, and your actual resources are too limited, when compared with those of your opponents, for you to come out victorious. It will be great blindness of judgment, if, after you allow us to retire, you do not find some policy more prudent than this. You will surely not be caught by that idea of disgrace, which proves so fatal to mankind in dangers that are disgraceful, and at the same time too plain to be mistaken. For all too often the very men that have their eyes perfectly open to what they are rushing into let this thing called "disgrace", by the mere influence of a seductive name, lead them on to a point at which they become so enslaved by the word as to fall wilfully into hopeless disaster. As a result they incur a kind of disgrace which, since it comes hand-in-hand with error, is even more disgraceful than when it comes as the result of misfortune. If you are sensible you will guard against this. And you will not think it dishonourable to submit to the greatest city in Greece, when it makes you the moderate offer of becoming its tributary ally without ceasing to enjoy the country that belongs to you. Nor will you be so blinded, when you are given a choice between war and security, as to choose the worse option. It is a fact that those who do not yield to their equals, who keep terms with their superiors, and are moderate towards their inferiors, generally succeed best. So think over the matter after we depart, and keep on reflecting that it is for your country that you are consulting, that you only have one, and that its prosperity or ruin depend on this single decision.

The Athenians now withdrew from the conference. The Melians, left to themselves, came to the same decision that they had maintained in the discussion, and answered:

Melians. Our resolution, Athenians, is the same as it was at first. We will not deprive a city of freedom in a moment, when people have been living here for seven hundred years; but we put our trust in the fortune of the gods which has preserved it so far, and in the help of men, namely of the Lakedaimonians. In this way we shall try to save ourselves. Meanwhile we invite you to allow us to be friends to you, and foes to neither party; and to retire from our country after making a treaty upon which we shall both agree.

Such was the answer of the Melians. The Athenians, now departing from the conference, said:

Athenians. Well, judging from these resolutions, it seems to us that you alone regard what is in the future as more sure than what is in front of your eyes, and, in your eagerness, what is out of sight as already coming to pass. As you have staked your fortune and hopes and put faith primarily in the Lakedaimonians, so you will be utterly deceived.

The Athenian ambassadors now returned to the army. The Melians showed no signs of yielding, and the Athenian generals at once opened hostilities, and drew a siege-wall around the Melians, dividing the labour among the different nations in their contingent. Subsequently the Athenians returned home with most of their army, leaving behind a certain number of their own citizens and of the allies to keep guard by land and sea. The force left behind in this way stayed on and besieged the place.

[ ... ] The Melians attacked by night and captured the part of the Athenian lines over against the market, and killed some of the men. They brought in corn and anything else that they could find useful to them, and so returned and kept quiet, while the Athenians took measures to keep better guard in future.

[ ... ]

About the same time the Melians again took another part of the Athenian lines which were only weakly garrisoned. In consequence of this reinforcements later arrived from Athens under the command of Philokrates, son of Demeas. The siege was now pressed vigorously; some treachery took place inside, and the Melians surrendered at discretion. The Athenians executed all the adult males whom they captured, and sold the women and children as slaves. Subsequently they sent out five hundred colonists and inhabited the place themselves.